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Abstract
This Article will focus on one particular accession condition that is illustrative of this phe-
nomenon, namely, the protection of minorities. The Copenhagen criteria encompass the “respect
for and protection of minorities” as one of the conditions for acceding to the Union, but the Treaty
on European Union (”TEU”) does not explicitly mention the protection of minorities as one of the
EU’s principles, objectives, or competences. It is argued that the question of minority rights could
find its way onto the EU internal policy agenda not only as a concern of various new Member
States, but also as an unintended consequence of the pre-accession conditionality established by
the Union in this regard. After examining the question of whether the ”respect for and protection
of minorities” is covered by EU law under the Treaty on European Union, this Article highlights
some of the implications of accession for the respect for, and protection of, minorities. It then
looks at whether the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, drafted by the European
Convention, makes any suggestion to narrow the discrepancy between accession conditions and
membership obligations, in regards to minority rights.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a truism to say that accession of ten countries to the
European Union ("EU" or the "Union")' will provoke a number
of internal institutional modifications, notably as regards the
Union's decision-making process and the functioning of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice.2 It also seems obvious, in the light of
previous EU enlargements and considering the remarkable
number of acceding States, that additional policy areas that are
closer to home for new Members will appear on the Union
agenda. This Article suggests that the emergence of new policies
could be catalyzed by the specific conditionality that was estab-
lished by the Union to prepare the candidates for accession.
This conditionality consists of a close EU monitoring of the
candidates' progressive fulfillment of accession requirements de-
fined by the European Council,' which elaborate on the provi-
* University College, London. The author wishes to thank Dr. Anne Myrjord and
Dr. Michael Dougan for their invaluable suggestions. The author bears sole responsibil-
ity for the contents of the Article.
1. Namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
2. See R. Von Weiszhcker et al., The Institutional Consequences of Enlargement (Report
for the European Commission, Brussels, 1999); Adapting the Institutions to make a Success
of Enlargement (Commission IGC Opinion, 2000); Council of the European Union, An
Effective Council for an Enlarged Union (Council's paper), at http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/
index.htm (last visitedJan. 24, 2004). See also Bruno de Witte, The Impact of Enlargement
on the Constitution of the European Union, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
209 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003).
3. See Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL.,
no. 6, at § 7(A)(iii) (1993) [hereinafter Conclusions of the Presidency] (establishing
these accession requirements). The latter have since been referred to as the "Copenha-
gen criteria." To be able to accede, the Copenhagen criteria require a candidate coun-
try to have achieved the following:
[S]tability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a func-
tioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pres-
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sions of Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU").'
This method aimed to ensure not only that candidates would be
as fit as possible to accede, but also that such an unprecedented
enlargement would not hold back the momentum of integra-
tion.5 In view of these aims, the accession conditionality has
sometimes entailed requirements that, at least in certain areas,
are more extensive and stricter than those which the Member
States are expected to comply with, qua Member States of the
EU. In other words, a discrepancy has appeared between some
EU accession requirements and corresponding membership ob-
ligations. It is even arguable that in the context of pre-accession,
the constitutional principle of "conferral of powers" does not ap-
ply, or at least not as strictly as in the internal context.6
sure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candi-
date's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
Id.
4. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 49, 0.J. C 325/5, at
31 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 67, at 78 (ex Article 0) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU], incorporat-
ing changes made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts Feb. 26, 2001, 0.J.
C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending Treaty on European Union
("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establish-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering arti-
cles of TEU and EC Treaty). Article 49 of the Consolidated TEU states:
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may
apply to become a Member of the Union. It shall address its application to the
Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and
after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an
absolute majority of its component members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the
Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agree-
ment shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional requirements.
Id.
5. This concern became the so-called fourth Copenhagen criteria: enlargement
should be subject to "[t]he Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining
the momentum of European integration ... in the general interest of both the Union
and the candidate countries." Conclusions of the Presidency, supra note 3, at Introduc-
tion. See also Geoffrey Edwards, Reforming the EU Institutional Framework: A New EU Obli-
gation?, in ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A "LEGAL" APPROACH (Christophe
Hillion ed., forthcoming 2004).
6. This principle is based on Article 5 of the EC Treaty, which states that the "Com-
munity shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of
the objectives assigned to it therein." Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, art. 5, O.J. C 325/33, at 41-42 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, at 80-81
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The logical consequence of this phenomenon is that, in
some areas, the EU could be less influential vis-d-vis the acceding
countries once they have entered, than it was before they be-
came full-fledged Members. The current Member States might,
therefore, require that the same level of monitoring be carried
on through new mechanisms to ensure that the accession crite-
ria are still observed by the acceding States, once they have en-
tered the Union. The extensive safeguard clauses introduced in
the Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia
("Accession Treaty")7 tend to support that view.' At the same
time, new Member States might equally feel that this monitoring
should be extended to the current Member States as well, nota-
bly to obliterate the "double standards" or feelings of "second-
class membership." Overall, membership obligations and acces-
sion conditions should be more consistent.
This Article will focus on one particular accession condition
that is illustrative of this phenomenon, namely, the protection of
minorities.9 The Copenhagen criteria encompass the "respect
for and protection of minorities" as one of the conditions for
(ex Article 3b) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty] incorporating changes made by
Treaty of Nice, supra note 4.
7. Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003, Apr. 16, 2003, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/treaty-ofi-accession_200
3/index.htm [hereinafter Accession Treaty].
8. See Kirstyn Inglis, The Accession Treaty and its Transitional Arrangements: A Twilight
Zone for the Future Members of the Union, in ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A
"LEGAL" APPROACH, supra note 5.
9. See Minority Rights Group, EU Accession Exposes Double Standards on Minor-
ity Rights, available at http://www.minorityrights.org/news-detail.asp?ID=107 (Apr. 15,
2003); see also Open Society Institute, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority
Protection, available at http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/content/07 (2002). See,
e.g., Giuliano Amato & Judy Batt, Minority Rights and Enlargement to the East, ROBERT
SCHUMAN CENTRE POLICY PAPER, No. 98/5 (Eur. Univ. Inst., 1998); Bruno de Witte,
Politics Versus Law in the EU's Approach to the Issue of Ethnic Minorities, ROBERT SCHUMAN
CENTRE POLICY PAPER, No. 2000/4 (Eur. Univ. Inst., 2000); Gabriel Toggenburg, A
Rough Orientation Through a Delicate Relationship: The European Union's Endeavours for (its)
Minorities, in 4 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 16 (2000); Manfred Nowak,
Human Rights "Conditionality" in Relation to, and Full Participation in, the EU, in THE EU
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 687, 692 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); Andre Liebich, Ethnic Minori-
ties and Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement (Robert Schuman Centre Work-
ing Paper No. 98/49, 1998) (on file with the European University Institute); Kristin
Henrad, The Impact of the Enlargement Process on the Development of a Minority Protection
Policy within the EU: Another Aspect of Responsibility/Burden - Sharing? 9 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 357 (2002); Gaetano Pentassuglia, The EUand the Protection of Minorities:
the case of Eastern Europe, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 20 (2001).
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acceding to the Union, but the Treaty on European Union
("TEU") does not explicitly mention the protection of minori-
ties as one of the EU's principles, objectives, or competences. It
is argued that the question of minority rights could find its way
onto the EU internal policy agenda not only as a concern of vari-
ous new Member States, but also as an unintended consequence
of the pre-accession conditionality established by the Union in
this regard.
After examining the question of whether the "respect for
and protection of minorities" is covered by EU law under the
Treaty on European Union, this Article highlights some of the
implications of accession for the respect for, and protection of,
minorities. It then looks at whether the Draft Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe,1 ° drafted by the European Conven-
tion, makes any suggestion to narrow the discrepancy between
accession conditions and membership obligations, in regards to
minority rights.
I. RESPECT FOR AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES' RIGHTS
UNDER THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
Three sets of provisions will be examined to establish
whether EU law covers the requirement of "respect for and pro-
tection of minorities": (1) the foundational principles of the
Union; (2) the fundamental rights to be respected by the EU as
general principles of Community Law; and (3) the list of EU
competences.
First, the EU foundational principles, as provided in Article
6 of the TEU, are not unambiguous as to whether they could
include respect for and protection of minorities. Article 6(1) re-
fers to the principle of "liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law .... "'
No specific mention is made of minorities' rights, and it is un-
clear whether they are included in the expression "human rights
and fundamental freedoms . "...12
Article 6(2) of the TEU is equally silent on this point. It
10. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003 O.J. C 169/1
(2003) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
11. Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 6(1), O.J. C 325/5, at 11 (2002), 37 I.L.M.
at 69 (ex Article F).
12. It should be recalled that the Copenhagen criteria make a distinction between
human rights on the one hand, and the respect for and protection of minorities, on the
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provides that: " [t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law." 13 The question is whether the concept of mi-
nority rights is encapsulated within the notion of "fundamental
rights," which have to be respected as general principles of Com-
munity Law.
Article 6(2) makes an explicit reference to Article 14 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"), which provides that: "[t]he
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Conven-
tion shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status."14 Since the EU shall respect the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR as general princi-
ples of Community Law, one could suggest that the EU is also
bound to ensure the principle of non-discrimination based on
association with a national minority. One should note, however,
that Article 14 of the ECHR does not establish a free-standing
right, given that it refers to "the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention."15 On the other hand,
the general principles of Community Law do not incorporate
the provisions of the ECHR, as such, in EU law; they rather ex-
tract the general principles enshrined in the ECHR and apply
them in the context of the Treaty provisions.16 Hence, the gen-
eral principle of non-discrimination set out in Article 14 of the
ECHR binds the Union as a general principle of Community
other hand, thereby suggesting that the latter is distinct from the former. See supra note
3.
13. Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 6(2), O.J. C 325/5, at 12 (2002), 37 I.L.M.
at 69 (ex Article F).
14. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm [hereinafter ECHR] (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case
22/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, 1 18; Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd., Case C-185/97,
[1998] 5199, 11 21-23; see also Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi, Watson &
Belmann Case 118/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1185, 1207.
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Law in the context of the TEU, and not solely in relation to the
rights and freedoms set forth by the Convention.
Since Article 6(2) also refers to "the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States," the question arises as to
whether the conjunctive "and" found between the reference to
the ECHR and "as they result" suggests that the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States are not an alternative
source of human rights protection, but rather a cumulative re-
quirement for protection. If that were the right interpretation,
the argument that protection should also derive from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States would not sit
easily with the fact that some of the latter are not particularly
receptive to the concept of minorities, as notably illustrated by
the list of parties to the Council of Europe Framework Conven-
tion on the Protection of National Minorities. 7 On the other
hand, Article 6(2) encapsulates the well-established case law of
the European Court of Justice regarding the observance of the
general principles of Community Law. The Court has always
considered that, in ensuring the observance of fundamental
rights that belong to the general principles of Community Law,
it draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, and also from the guidelines supplied by in-
ternational treaties for the protection of human rights on which
the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signa-
tories," In other words, the recognition of a fundamental right
in the sense of Article 6(2) of the TEU does not require that it is
provided by the ECHR and that it is also a constitutional tradi-
tion common to the Member States. Moreover, the absence of
the recognition of minority rights by one Member State's consti-
tutional tradition should not necessarily constitute an obstacle to
17. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1998,
E.T.S. No. 157, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListe-
Traites.htm [hereinafter Framework Convention]. According to the Council of Europe
website, France is the only Member State that has not signed it. Regarding the new
Member States, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia are parties, while Latvia is a signatory. See also Nowak, supra note 9;
de Witte, supra note 9.
18. See J. Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffgross Handlung v. Comm'n of the EC, Case
4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, 13; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979]
E.C.R. 3727; Roquette Freres SA v. Directeur G4nbral de la Concurrence, de la Consom-
mation et de la Repression des Fraudes, C-94/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9011, 23-24; SA
Cimenteries CBR v. Comm'n of the EC, Case T-25/95, [2000] E.C.R. U-491, 713.
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its recognition by the Court as a fundamental right derived from
the constitutional traditions of the Member States, in the sense
of Article 6(2) of the TEU. 9 Indeed, all the Member States are
signatories of the ECHR and thus bound by its provisions,
whether or not their constitutional tradition otherwise includes
the protection of minorities.
Consequently, it can be suggested that the general principle
of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR is
part of the fundamental rights that the EU is bound to respect,
as a general principle of Community Law, on the basis of Article
6(2) of the TEU.
What does that mean in practical terms? Since the Court is
granted jurisdiction by Article 46(d) of the TEU to guarantee
the observance of provisions of Article 6(2) of the TEU, a mem-
ber of a minority who would be discriminated against in the con-
text of EU law should be able to challenge that discrimination.
In principle, this route would only offer a limited opportunity to
enforce a non-discrimination action given that under Article
46(d) of the TEU, the Court guarantees the observance of Arti-
cle 6(2) of the TEU only "with regard to action of the institutions,
insofar as the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaties establish-
ing the European Communities and under the . . . [TEU] .'2°
Hence, an individual would not be able to invoke Article 6(2) of
the TEU against a Member State that would infringe the funda-
mental rights referred thereto. On the other hand, the Court of
Justice has made it clear that the general principles of Commu-
nity Law apply not only to actions of institutions, but also to ac-
tions by the Member States when acting in the context of Com-
munity law. 21 In other words, it seems likely that individuals
would be able to rely on the general principles of Community
Law to challenge a measure, taken either by the institutions or
by a Member State acting within the scope of Community law,
19. See Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Comm'n of the EC, Case 17/74, [1974]
E.C.R. 1063.
20. Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 46(d), O.J. C 325/5 at 30 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 77 (ex Article L) (emphasis added).
21. See Wachauf v. Bundesamt ffir Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft, Case 5/88,
[1989] E.C.R. 2609, 1 19; Queen v. Bostock, Case C-2/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-955, 16;
Johnston, Case 22/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, 19; RoquetteFrres SA, Case C-94/00, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-9011, 25.
2004]
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that would discriminate against them because of their associa-
tion with a national minority.
Along with the judicial remedy, a political route could also
be envisaged to challenge a breach of minority rights. Article 7
of the TEU establishes a procedure to suspend the rights of a
Member State as a result of a clear risk of a serious breach of
fundamental principles by this State, even if not acting within
the scope of EU law. These provisions, however, only refer to
those principles established in Article 6(1) of the TEU. As
pointed out earlier, Article 6(1) relates inter alia to "human
rights and fundamental freedoms," but not explicitly to minority
rights. Moreover, the procedure of Article 7 of the TEU might
be too cumbersome for adopting adequate measures against a
wrong-doing Member State. Consider particularly the first para-
graph, which provides that the Council needs to act by a majority
of four-fifths of its members to determine the risk of a serious
breach. Furthermore, the Council is not under an obligation to
act. By using the term "may determine," Article 7(1) of the TEU
suggests that the Council has discretion in this regard.
The foregoing suggests that the provisions of Article 6(1)
and 6(2) of the TEU could provide for a limited remedy against
a breach of the principle of non-discrimination based on "associ-
ation with a national minority." As a general principle of Com-
munity Law, it could be enforced by the European Court of Jus-
tice both against institutions and against Member States acting
in the context of EU law. In addition, if minority rights are in-
cluded in the notion of "human rights and fundamental free-
doms," political action of the Council would also be possible
against a State likely to breach the fundamental principles of the
Union, although at the Council's own discretion, and provided
that some institutional hurdles are overcome.
Turning to the question of a potential EU competence to
ensure "respect for and protection of minorities," one needs par-
ticularly to consider the provisions of Article 13 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") which en-
ables the Council of the European Union (the "Council") to
adopt European Community ("EC") measures to combat dis-
crimination.22 While the "association with a national minority" is
22. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 13, O.J. C 325/33, at 43 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 82 (ex Article 6a). The present contribution does not explore the provisions
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not explicitly mentioned, Article 13 of the EC Treaty endows the
Council with the power to take appropriate action to combat dis-
crimination based, inter alia, on "racial or ethnic origin ....
Although uncertain, one could wonder whether Article 13 of the
EC Treaty offers a basis for adopting measures also against dis-
crimination based on association with a national minority.
Without explicitly mentioning the expression "national mi-
norities," the Council Directive implementing the principle of
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic
origin nonetheless refers in its Preamble to several sources which
partly cover the question of minorities.24 For instance, it men-
tions the Employment Guidelines for 2000 that were agreed upon by
the Helsinki European Council, and which aimed inter alia at
combating discrimination against groups "such as ethnic minori-
ties. '25 It also cites a 1996 Council Joint Action concerning ac-
tion to combat racism and xenophobia,26 which contains provi-
sions that could cover the protection of minorities. 2' Further-
more, the Commission's Communication, "Countering Racism,
Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism in the Candidate Countries,"
contains several sections on the situation of national minorities
in Central and Eastern Europe.28
of Article 151 of the EC Treaty, on cultural cooperation. These provisions have not
been used so far to promote "respect for and protection of minorities." On these provi-
sions, see de Witte, supra note 9; Henrard, supra note 9.
23. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 13, O.J. C 325/33, at 43 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 82 (ex Article 6a).
24. Council Directive No. 2000/43/EC, pmbl., O.J. L 180/22, at 2-3 (2000)
(citing, e.g., Art. 6 Consolidated TEU, the ECHR, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as support for the Directive).
25. Employment Guidelines for 2000 No. 13606/99 (1999).
26. Joint Action of 15July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3
(now Article 31) of the Treaty on European Union, concerning action to combat ra-
cism and xenophobia No. 96/443/JHA, O.J. L 185/5 (1996).
27. Id. tit. I(A), OJ. L 185/5 (1996). Title I(A) of the joint Action states:
In the interests of combating racism and xenophobia, each Member State
shall undertake . . . to ensure effective judicial cooperation in respect of of-
fences based on the following types of behaviour, and, if necessary for the
purposes of that cooperation, either to take steps to see that such behaviour is
punishable as a criminal offence or, failing that, and pending the adoption of
any necessary provisions, to derogate from the principle of double criminality
for such behaviour: (a) public incitement to discrimination, violence or racial
hatred in respect of a group of persons or a member of such a group defined
by reference to colour, race, religion or national or ethnic origin ....
Id. (emphasis added).
28. Communication from the Commission, Countering Racism, Xenophobia and
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It could thus be suggested that Article 13 of the EC Treaty,
although silent on the question of minorities, could nonetheless
be relied upon by the Council for adopting measures which
would cover, inter alia, discrimination against persons based on
their status as national minorities. By contrast, however, it seems
unlikely that the Council could adopt a measure dealing specifi-
cally with that type of discrimination, as the Directive mentioned
above did in relation to discrimination based on racial or ethnic
origin.29
A look at the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights ("Charter") might be informative in this regard."0 Article
21(1) of the Charter provides that "[a]ny discrimination based
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth,
disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited."31 The
fact that the Charter makes an explicit reference to "member-
ship of a national minority" as an additional basis for non-dis-
crimination could be interpreted as barring Article 13 of the EC
Treaty from being used to adopt specific measures to combat
discrimination based on membership of a national minority. The
explanation given to Article 21 of the Charter by the Convention
that drafted it is the following: "Paragraph 1 draws on Article 13
of the EC Treaty, Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine as regards ge-
netic heritage. " It could be argued that the expression "mem-
bership of a national minority" finds its source in Article 14 of
the ECHR rather than in EC law, even if the wording of Article
21 of the Charter is slightly different from that of Article 14 of
the ECHR. This would tend to confirm that Article 13 of the EC
Treaty could not be used as a basis for adopting measures specifi-
cally to combat discrimination based on membership of a na-
Anti-Semitism in the Candidate Countries, COM (1999) 256 Final, available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/documentssen.htm (May 26, 1999).
29. See Council Directive No. 2000/43/EC, O.J. L 180/22 (2000).
30. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 364/1 (2000)
[hereinafter Charter].
31. Id. art. 21(1), O.J. C 364/1, at 13 (2000) (emphasis added).
32. See Council of the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union: Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter, at 39,
available at http://www.consilium.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang=en (Dec. 2000) (explain-
ing Article 21).
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tional minority. Indeed, the Charter makes it clear in its so-
called horizontal clauses that it "does not establish any new
power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify pow-
ers and tasks defined by the Treaties."" Last but not least, the
Charter is not presently enforceable. Solemnly proclaimed in
Nice by the Council, the Commission, and the European Parlia-
ment, it was not made binding by the Member States.
Nevertheless, the Charter was thereafter published as an in-
ter-institutional agreement and as such binds the three institu-
tions. The principles established by the Charter are thus taken
into account in the EU decision making processes.3 4 Further-
more, as a statement of Union law, 5 the provisions of the Char-
ter could be indirectly binding through the medium of the gen-
eral principles of Community Law. Although, it still does not
give competence to the Union to adopt measures to combat dis-
crimination based on membership of a national minority, it rein-
forces the argument that was made earlier regarding the princi-
ples enshrined in the ECHR.
The foregoing suggests that under the TEU, discrimination
based on association with a national minority can be challenged
before the European Court of Justice, on the basis that such dis-
crimination would violate one of the general principles of Com-
munity Law. Moreover, if respect for, and protection of, minori-
ties is considered to belong to the Union's fundamental princi-
ples, it could lead to the suspension of membership rights of a
Member State that would breach or risk to breach this funda-
33. See Charter, supra note 30, art. 51(2), OJ. C 364/1, at 21 (2000).
34. See also Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochire, The Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Beyond, 4 CAMBRJDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEG. STUD. 133 (2001); F. Jacobs, The EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, in AccOuNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 275
(Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott eds., 2002); Grdinne de Bsrca, The Drafting of the
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 26 EuR. L. REv. 126 (2001).
35. Charter, supra note 30, pmbl., OJ. C 364/1, at 8 (2000). The Preamble of the
Charter states in its fifth indent that
[t]his Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Com-
munity and the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they re-
sult, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obliga-
tions common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the
Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Com-
munity and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.
Id. See also Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, The Queen v. Secretary of State of
Trade and Industry, Case C-173/99, [2001] ECR 1-4881, 27-28.
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mental principle, on the basis of Article 7 of the TEU. Finally,
the principle of non-discrimination as provided in Article 21 of
the Charter entails that the EU institutions are to take it into
account in the exercise of their powers. It also reinforces the
idea that it is a general principle of Community Law that is bind-
ing on institutions and on Member States when acting within the
scope of Community law. At the same time, EU law, as it stands,
does not seem to entitle the Union to adopt positive measures
specifically to combat discrimination against national minorities.
A fortiori, it does not entitle the Union to adopt measures to en-
sure the respect for and protection of minorities to the extent
that it did in relation to the accession candidates.16
The protection of minorities is thus likely to be less scruti-
nized and ensured in a Member State than in a candidate coun-
try. On the one hand, it could be argued that since the candi-
dates were declared ready to join by the European Council, they
were, as such, deemed to have fulfilled the accession conditions
including the one related to the protection of minorities. On
the basis of this assumption, the strict political, economic, and
legal conditionality attached to the pre-accession strategy would
36. For instance, on the basis of the 1999 Accession Partnership, which establishes
the list of priorities of candidates' preparation for accession, the Commission set the
following medium-term requirements for Slovakia: it should "continue implementation
of the minority language legislation and protect the use of minority languages in the
field of education, culture and the media including adoption of any necessary legis-
lation." Slovakia: 1999 Accession Partnership, § 4.2, at 7 (1999), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/apO200/en/ap-sk_99.pdf. Similarly, the
2001 Accession Partnership set the following priority for Slovakia:
-Continue improving the situation of the Roma through strengthened imple-
mentation of the relevant strategy, including the provision of the necessary
financial support at national and local levels; measures aimed at fighting
against discrimination (including within the public administration), fostering
employment opportunities, increasing access to education, improving housing
conditions; provide adequate financial support.
-Ensure due implementation of the minority language legislation.
-Ensure that an effective system for redressing police misconduct is estab-
lished.
Slovakia: 2001 Accession Partnership, § 4, at 6 (2001), available at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/enlargement/report200l/apsk en.pdf.
The 2001 Accession Partnership with Latvia requires it to, "[c]ontinue to imple-
ment further concrete measures for the integration of non-citizens, on the basis of the
National Programme 'The Integration of Society in Latvia', including language training
and information campaigns, and provide the necessary financial support." Latvia: 2001
Accession Partnership, § 4, at 6 (2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/en-
largement/report2001/aplv-en.pdf.
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no longer be necessary. On the other hand, a quick look at the
Accession Treaties shows that a number of transitional periods
have been established. While some of them resulted from vari-
ous Member States' pressures, such as the transition on the free
movement of workers, others were established in view of the
fact that accession preparation was not yet finished. Indeed, the
safeguard clause shows that the current Member States have only
a limited trust in the ability of the newcomers to fulfill their obli-
gations.3' Thus, in general terms, adaptation to meet the mem-
bership requirements will continue after accession, and transi-
tional periods as well as safeguard clauses will be used, in addi-
tion to the classic enforcement mechanisms such as Article 226
of the EC Treaty,3 to tackle problems of implementation of EC
law.
If one turns to the question of the protection of minorities,
one may wonder how such a post-accession approach would ap-
ply. Even if that protection was considered to be satisfactory
upon accession,4 one could still speculate as to how an unsolved
or indeed new minority problem would be tackled inside the
EU. The Accession Treaty does not seem to contain any particu-
lar provisions to solve potential problems of that kind, and the
EU will not have the same leverage and pro-active stance that it
used to have in the pre-accession context. Such a discrepancy
could be problematic considering that minority problems are
clearly likely to persist after enlargement, as the next part will
highlight.
37. See Michael Dougan, A Sceptre is haunting Europe: Free Movement of Persons and the
Eastern Enlargement, in ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A "LEGAL" APPROACH,
supra note 5.
38. See also Inglis, supra note 8.
39. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 226, O.J. C 325/33, at 125 (2002),
37 I.L.M. at 125 (ex Article 169).
40. In that regard, it is instructive to compare the Commission Progress Reports
with the report published by the Open Society Institute, Monitoring the EU Accession Pro-
cess: Minority Protection (Open Soc'y Inst., 2002), available at http://www.eumap.org/
reports/2002/content/07. It has been argued that the Commission Progress Reports
were sometimes too lax so far as the treatment of minorities is concerned, particularly
in the Baltic States. See, e.g., Marc Maresceau, The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: A Political
and Legal Analysis, in THE EU's ENLARGEMENT AND MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGIES 3 n.16
(Marc Maresceau & E. Lannon eds., 2001); P. van Elsuwege, The Baltic States on the Road
to EU Accession: Opportunities and Challenges, 7 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 171 (2002).
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II. THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN THE ENLARGED EU
As suggested earlier, the EU has sought through the Copen-
hagen criteria to warrant, inter alia, the respect for and protec-
tion of minorities in the candidate countries; it also wanted to
make sure that they would not bring international tensions when
they join the Union. In this perspective, the candidates were en-
couraged to conclude bilateral agreements between themselves,
notably to guarantee minority rights. Accession conditionality
has also forced candidate countries to review their internal rules
regarding their minorities. The EU accession conditionality has
undoubtedly played a positive role.4" While many of the previ-
ous minority problems have been solved, it is, however, likely
that several will remain for some time to come, and others could
well emerge in the post-accession context.
Consider the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in
the Baltic States, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. While their
conditions have, to a large extent, been improved by the respec-
tive national authorities, notably under the pressure of the
Union, it is noteworthy that many members of these minorities
are still "non-citizens" or "Stateless." Under EU law, these "non-
citizens" will have difficulties enjoying the same rights as their
countrymen and women, particularly when it comes to free
movement rights and rights connected with European citizen-
ship.
4 2
Another consequence of accession will be that some minori-
ties will be cut off from their motherland. For instance, as a new
Member State, Hungary will have to apply stricter border con-
trols vis-A-vis Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine. Like the
other candidates, Hungary had to adopt the so-called Union ac-
quis on the basis of the third Copenhagen criteria. Since the
41. See Judith Kelley, Membership, Management and Enforcement: European Institutions
and Eastern Europe's Ethnic Politics (Ann. Meeting of the Am. Pol. Sci. Assoc., 2002),
available at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/O15/01501llKelleyJudi.pdf
(discussing the role of conditionality).
42. See, e.g., Latvian Non-Citizens Excluded from Voting, EU OBSERVER, Oct. 15, 2003,
available at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=13003. Such difficulties may
exist even if some legislation extends certain rights to stateless persons. See, e.g., Council
Regulation No. 307/1999, O.J. L 38/1 (1999) ("[A]mending Regulation (EEC) No.
1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-
employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community and
Regulation (EEC) No. 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation
(EEC) No. 1408/71 with a view to extending them to cover students.").
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Amsterdam Treaty, the Union acquis includes the Schengen ac-
quis' s on border controls. 44 The latter has to be applied by the
new Member States, if not all from the day of accession, then
very soon thereafter.4 5 Consequently, for the members of the
Hungarian minority living in Romania, accession of Hungary to
the Union will mean that crossing the border to their mother-
land might become more complicated. The situation will be
even more intricate for members of the Hungarian minorities
based in Ukraine, since, unlike the Romanians, Ukrainians need
a visa to enter the EU.4 6
In addition, as a new Member State, Hungary will be under
the obligation of Article 307 of the EC Treaty47 to adjust or even
denounce its pre-accession external commitments if they are in-
compatible with the acquis.4 8 In particular, it may have to review
some of the bilateral agreements it concluded with the neighbor-
ing countries that host Hungarian minorities. These agreements
were concluded in the context of the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities ("Framework Conven-
tion"), under the auspices of the Council of Europe,49 and
43. See Europa, FAQ - Freedom to Travel: What is the Schengen acquis?, at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/usticehome/faq/freetravel/faqfreetravel-en.htm (last visited
Dec. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Europa, FAQJ ("Schengen acquis is the set of rules which
has been adopted into an inter-governmental framework and have been integrated in
the framework of the European Union with the entry into force of the treaty of Amster-
dam. Countries seeking EU membership must adopt this acquis 'in full' into their own
national legislation.").
44. See Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J.
C 340/1, at 96 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending TEU, EC Treaty,
ECSC Treaty, and Euratom Treaty and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
45. See Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Re-
public of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithu-
ania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Re-
public of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on
which the European Union is founded, OJ. L 236/33, art. 3 (2003) [hereinafter Act of
Accession] (stating that the provisions of the Schengen acquis shall be binding on new
Members from the date of accession).
46. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, OJ. L 81/1 (2001) ("[L]isting the
third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the exter-
nal borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.").
47. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 307, O.J. C 325/33, at 152-53
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 139 (ex Article 234).
48. See Attorney General v. Burgoa, Case 812/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2787, 6; Levy,
Case C-158/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4287, 11; Commission v. Portugal, Case C-62/98,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-5171, 1 43; 38 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1269 (2001).
49. See Framework Convention, supra note 17.
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aimed inter alia at ensuring that Hungarian minority rights
would be guaranteed. Indeed, the signing of these types of bilat-
eral or multilateral agreements was regarded by the EU as a way
to fulfill the accession condition relating to the protection of mi-
norities, given that one of the important aspects of such agree-
ments was that cross-border exchange between members of na-
tional minorities and their motherlands would be encouraged by
the parties.5 °
The foregoing illustrates the potential tension between the
accession criteria and membership obligations. One could fore-
see incompatibilities between the Schengen acquis and the bilat-
eral agreements that Hungary qua candidate was encouraged to
sign with its neighbors to ensure the rights of Hungarian minori-
ties. In other words, what it was encouraged to do to fulfill the
political accession conditions might have to be deconstructed as
a result of accession, notably due to the application of the
Schengen rules. Further, the accession obligations derived from
the third Copenhagen criteria (i.e., adoption of the acquis) seem
to clash with the obligations attached to the first Copenhagen
criteria (i.e., protection of minorities rights).5"
Similar risks of inconsistencies could appear in the context
of the EU policy vis-A-vis the countries from the Western Balkans,
which have been recognized by the EU as "potential candi-
dates."5 2 One of the key requirements the latter have to fulfill is
50. Article 17(1) of the Framework Convention provides:
The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to
national minorities to establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across
frontiers with persons lawfully staying in other States, in particular those with
whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, or a com-
mon cultural heritage.
Id.
51. It has been otherwise suggested that the Union might be in breach of interna-
tional principles in relation to minorities. See, e.g., Amato & Batt, supra note 9 (arguing
that the EU and its Member States could contravene the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Docu-
ment; the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; and the Council of Europe's Framework
Convention).
52. See Feira European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6,
at 67 (2000). The European Council recognized the Western Balkans (Albania, Bos-
nia & Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as
Serbia & Montenegro) as potential candidates. The EU has established a specific policy
of "Stabilization and Association" in relation to these countries, with a view notably
towards preparing their future membership. Their "European perspective" was force-
fully confirmed by the Copenhagen and Thessaloniki European Councils in December
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to commit themselves to enhance regional cooperation.53 While
this requirement might be crucial to foster the process of recon-
ciliation in the Western Balkans, it might not sit easily with other
principles of the EU pre-accession strategy vis-A-vis these coun-
tries, namely the "own merits" and "catch up" principles. Con-
sider, for instance, the (not so unlikely) situation whereby Croa-
tia, which has already formally applied for membership, would
fulfill the accession criteria faster than its neighbors. An applica-
tion of the "own merits" principle means that Croatia would
more likely become a member before the other candidates from
the Western Balkans. An early accession of Croatia would proba-
bly mean that it would have to adjust or denounce some of the
agreements that it had to conclude with its neighbors under the
pre-accession condition of regional cooperation.54
To sum up, accession does not mean the end of the minor-
ity question. Acute minority issues are likely to remain in the
new Member States,55 or indeed to appear upon accession, and
these issues will become Union problems. One should add, at
this point, that these issues are not exclusive to the new Member
States.56
It has been suggested that, while the remaining adaptation
2002 and June 2003 respectively. The latter took the step of consolidating their acces-
sion perspective by adopting an "Agenda" that sets out the guidelines to prepare such
an accession. See also Thessaloniki European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency,
E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 13, 1 41 (2000).
53. See, e.g., Maresceau, supra note 40; see also Marc Maresceau, Pre-accession, in 9
THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 2, at 34-37 (providing detailed
analysis of the key requirements).
54. As stated earlier, one of the accession conditions is the ability to take on the
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union. See supra notes 3-5, 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing require-
ments of the acquis). In other words, the candidate has to take on the acquis com-
munautaire and the rules incompatible with it should be adjusted. Id.
55. See Mihaela Gherghisan, Hungary Changes Controversial Status Law, EU OB-
SERVER, June 25, 2003, available at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=11861
(discussing the remaining tensions between Hungary and Slovakia concerning the Hun-
garian Status Law granting various rights and privileges to members of Hungarian mi-
norities). One could also mention the difficult situation of the Roma. "Romani com-
munities in Germany and Spain have received very limited [S]tate support" in "protect-
ing and promoting their distinct cultural and linguistic identities . . . ." See Open
Society Institute, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection, supra note 9, at
57-59.
56. See Open Society Institute, Monitoring Minority Protection in EU Member States
(2002) available at http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/content/09 (last visited Nov.
13, 2003).
2004]
732 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL
deficiencies as regards the acquis will be solved on the basis of
the Accession Treaty's arrangements, the situation will be differ-
ent in the case of the protection of minorities. The Accession
Treaty does not deal with minority issues and the EU cannot be
actively involved in promoting respect for and protection of mi-
norities internally. It will not be in a position to put pressure on
the Member States as it was, and still is, in relation to the candi-
dates.
The discrepancy between the remaining minority questions
and the limited tools available in the EU to tackle them might
thus generate the need to develop mechanisms to supervise the
respect for and protection of minorities equally after enlarge-
ment. If that were the case, accession requirements and mem-
bership obligations would be more in line with each other. 57
This Article will now turn to the Draft Constitution proposed by
the European Convention to examine whether these concerns
have been addressed.
III. MINORITY RIGHTS UNDER THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION
FOR EUROPE
The provisions of the TEU that were examined earlier were:
the principles on which the Union is based, the EU competence
to combat discrimination, and the provisions of the Charter.
This Section will look at whether the Constitution has modified
these provisions, in a sense of providing additional ability for the
Union to address the minority question.58
In the Draft Constitution ("Draft Treaty"), the principles on
which the Union is based (Article 6(1) of the TEU) are provided
in a new Article 1-2 of the Draft Treaty, concerning Union's Val-
ues: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human
dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights. These values are common to the Member
States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and
57. Such a need for post-accession monitoring mechanisms has already been partly
addressed. See supra Part I. The mechanism set out by Article 7 of the TEU was notably
established in the perspective of the accession of Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries ("CEECs"), regarded as "young" democracies. Id.
58. See Michael Dougan, The Convention's Draft Constitutional Treaty: Bringing Europe
Closer to its Lawyers, 28 EUR. L. REv. 763 (2003) (providing commentary on the Draft
Constitution).
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non-discrimination."59 Similar to Article 6(1) of the TEU, these
provisions do not refer explicitly to the protection of minority
rights. However, in contrast to Article 6(1) of the TEU, Article I-
2 of the Draft Treaty introduces "human dignity" and "equality"
in the list of "Union values. 6 ° In addition, the last part of the
provisions of Article 1-2 of the Draft Treaty - i.e., "in a society of
pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination"
- is new. It is arguable that these concepts, particularly "plural-
ism," "tolerance," and "non-discrimination" - here used on its
own - could be more amenable to the respect for and protec-
tion of minorities.
Mr. Peter Baltzs, a Hungarian member of the European
Convention, suggested amendments to Article 1-2 of the Draft
Treaty on two occasions in the course of the Convention's dis-
cussions. First, he proposed that respect for human rights be
supplemented by the expression "including those of national mi-
norities."61 He explained that his proposal would ensure that
Article 1-2 of the Draft Treaty also refers to the missing element
of the Copenhagen criteria "which makes an important part of
the acquis.''6 2 His second proposed amendment, supported by
other Conventionnels, was that the expression "respect for human
rights" be replaced by "respect for and protection of human
rights and those of minorities."63 Again, the argument was that
the missing element of the Copenhagen criteria should be in-
cluded. However, neither of the amendments were discussed or
accepted at that point.
59. Draft Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1-2, OJ. C 169/1, at 5 (2003).
60. One could also point out that the expression "fundamental freedoms" has
been removed.
61. Peter Balazs, Suggestion for Amendment of Article: 2, AMENDMENT FoRM, at http://
european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/2/Art%202%2Bal%C3%A1 zs.pdf (last
visited Jan. 27, 2004).
62. This amendment was proposed when Article 1-2 of the Draft Treaty was drafted
as follows: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty,
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, values which are common to
the Member States. Its aim is a society at peace, through the practice of tolerance,
justice and solidarity." See The European Convention, Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the
Constitutional Treaty, art. 2, ann. I, CONV 528/03, available at http://register.con-
silium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00528en03.pdf (Feb. 6, 2003).
63. The amendment was supported by eleven members of the Convention, includ-
ing a former French Minister, Mr. Alain Lamassoure. This second amendment was
proposed on the basis of the new formulation of Article 1-2 of the Draft Treaty which
includes the expression "non-discrimination."
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The absence of any reference to the protection of minori-
ties in Article 1-2 of the Draft Treaty is indeed remarkable in the
light of the quasi-constitutional nature which was granted to the
Copenhagen criteria.64 The Draft Treaty provisions on accession
provide that the latter is subject to the respect of the "values re-
ferred to Article in 2 . . "65 Considering the prominence of the
protection of minorities in the EU accession conditionality, one
could have anticipated, as did the Hungarian representative,
that it would have been mentioned in Article 1-2 of the Draft
Treaty.66 This omission suggests that "respect for and protection
of minorities" as an accession criterion is either implicitly in-
cluded in the more general values enshrined in Article 1-2 of the
Draft Treaty, or alternatively, while being an accession condi-
tion, it is regarded as a principle which is not important enough
to be listed among the other Union values.
The Italian Presidency, under which the Convention's draft
Constitution was initially discussed by the EU Heads of State or
Government, submitted an amended version of Article 1-2 of the
Draft Treaty. The new text reads as follows: "The Union is
founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, de-
mocracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to minority groups .... "67
Yet, it remains to be seen whether the Member States will
eventually accept this new version. Inserting the "protection of
minorities" in the list of principles mentioned in Article 1-2 of
the Draft Treaty would make it clear that the EU could sanction
64. See Christophe Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny, in ENLARGE-
MENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A "LEGAL" APPROACH, supra note 5; Enlargement: A Legal
Analysis, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 34, at
403.
65. Draft Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1-57(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 21 (2003).
66. The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union suggested that
Article 1-57 of the Draft Treaty should include a statement of the Copenhagen criteria.
See Select Committee on European Union, Eighteenth Report, 2002-03, 7, at 8.
67. See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, IGC 2003 - Intergovernmental Conference (12 -13 December 2003) ADDEN-
DUM 1 to the Presidency proposal, CIG 60/03 ADDI, available at http://www.con-
silium.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cgOO/cgOO060-ad0l.enO3.pdf (Dec. 9, 2003) (emphasis ad-
ded). This was an amended version included in the consolidated set of proposals sub-
mitted by the Presidency. The Presidency proposal for the Naples Ministerial Conclave
of November 25, 2003 already contained this amendment. See Conference of the Rep-
resentatives of the Governments of the Member States, IGC 2003 - Naples Ministerial
Conclave: Presidency proposal, CIG 52/03 ADD1, available at http://
www.consilium.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cgOO/cg00052-ad0l.enO3.pdf (Dec. 9, 2003).
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a State that would fail to ensure the respect for and protection of
minorities. Article 1-58 of the Draft Treaty, inspired by the provi-
sions of Article 7 of the TEU, provides for a procedure to sus-
pend that State's membership rights.6" It is noteworthy that the
procedure for the Council to determine "that there is a clear risk
of a serious breach by a Member State of the values mentioned
in Article 2" has been maintained: it still involves a four-fifths
majority of Council's members, which in an enlarged EU will
increase the number of States required to support the action
before the latter can be taken.6"
As regards fundamental rights, Article 1-7 of the Draft
Treaty states:
1. The Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and princi-
ples set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which con-
stitutes Part II of the Constitution.
2. The Union shall seek accession to the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's com-
petences as defined in the Constitution.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, and as they result from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, shall constitute general
principles of the Union's law.70
The two first paragraphs are more detailed than the provisions
of Article 6(2) of the TEU concerning the sources of fundamen-
tal rights which apply to the EU. The first paragraph partly clari-
fies the status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Al-
though drafted in an ambiguous fashion, Article 1-7 of the Draft
Treaty is the basis for the Charter to become binding. The pro-
visions of Article 11-21 of the Draft Treaty71 (presently Article 21
of the Charter) would then be turned into a full-fledged obliga-
tion. According to Article 11-51 of the Draft Treaty, the address-
68. Draft Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1-58, O.J. C 169/1, at 21-22 (2003). It is sym-
bolic that these provisions follow those concerning "the conditions of eligibility and
accession to the Union" set out in Article 1-57 of the Draft Treaty. Id. art. 1-57, O.J. C
169/1, at 21 (2003).
69. Id. art. 1-58, O.J. C 169/1, at 21-22 (2003). This means in practice that in a
Union of twenty-five Member States, twenty will have to back the decision, instead of
fifteen in an EU of fifteen members.
70. Id. art. 1-7, O.J. C 169/1, at 9 (2003).
71. Id. art. 11-21, O.J. C 169/1, at 25 (2003).
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ees of this obligation would be both the EU "Institutions, bodies
and agencies with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity
and ... the Member States only when they are implementing
Union law."
72
The law under the Draft Treaty would thus slightly contrast
with the law under the TEU, insofar as the former introduces an
express legal basis for the principle of non-discrimination based
on membership of a national minority. It is also noteworthy that
the principle established by the Charter is more assertive than
the provisions of Article 14 of the ECHR. While the latter states
that "[t] he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as ... association with a national minority ... , the
Charter requires that such discrimination "shall be prohibited,"
i.e., within the entire scope of application of Union law.74
This new development could be consolidated by the
Union's obligation to seek accession to the ECHR, as contained
in Article 1-7(2) of the Draft Treaty. The Agreement on acces-
sion to the ECHR would make the ECHR binding on the Union
and its Member States, and the provisions of Article 14 of the
ECHR would accordingly be part of the Union's legal obliga-
tions which could be enforced.75 While it is already the case
through the medium of the general principles of Community
Law, these obligations would be guaranteed by the European
Court of Justice, given its clear jurisdiction on the provisions of
Article I-7.76 The Court should also have the power to interpret
the provisions of the agreement between the Union and the
ECHR, and could possibly grant them direct effect. 77 In addi-
72. Id. art. 11-51(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003).
73. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 14-15 (discussing Article 14 of the ECHR).
75. See Draft Treaty, supra note 10, art. 111-225(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 72 (2003) (pro-
viding that: "[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions
of the Union and on its Member States").
76. The only limits to the Court's jurisdiction are contained in Article 111-282 of
the Draft Treaty and concern the provisions related to the Common Security and De-
fence Policy. Article 111-282 of the Draft Treaty provides in its first paragraph that
"[t]he Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction with respect to Articles 1-39 and 1-40
and the provisions of Chapter II of Title V of Part III concerning the common foreign
and security policy." See id. art. 111-282, O.J. C 169/1, at 81 (2003).
77. This will depend on whether the Court of Justice finds that the test is met for
determining whether the provisions of the external agreement concerned are directly
effective. Cf Demirel v. Gmund, Case 12/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3719; The Queen v.
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tion, the EU could be directly called to account before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights for breach of Article 14 of the
ECHR.
On the other hand, two limitations should be underlined.
First, as regards the Charter, the horizontal provision which pre-
vents any extension of the Union's competence on the basis of
the Charter has been maintained.7" In effect, Article 11-51(2) of
the Draft Treaty provides: "[t]his Charter does not extend the
field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or mod-
ify powers and tasks defined in the other Parts of the Constitu-
tion. 79
This type of clause is also featured in Article 1-7(2) of the
Draft Treaty, to the effect that accession of the Union to the
ECHR shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in
the Draft Constitution.
These two limiting clauses are particularly significant as re-
gards the question of the Union's competence to adopt mea-
sures to combat discrimination based on "membership of a na-
tional minority." In the Draft Treaty, the provisions of Article 13
of the EC Treaty have inspired the drafting of a new Article 111-8:
1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Constitu-
tion and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon
the Union, a European law or framework law of the Council
of Ministers may establish the measures needed to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Council of
Ministers shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of
the European Parliament.
2. European laws or framework laws may establish basic prin-
ciples for Union incentive measures and define such incen-
tive measures, to support action taken by Member States, ex-
cluding any harmonisation of their laws and regulations.8s
"Membership of a national minority" has still not been inserted
Gloszczuk, Case C-63/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6369; Hermes International v. FHT Marketing
Choice BV, Case C-53/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3603 (discussing the question of direct effect
of the WTO Agreement).
78. See Charter, supra note 30, art. 51(2), O.J. C 364/1, at 21 (2000). Article 51(2)
states: "[t]his Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or
the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties." Id.
79. See Draft Treaty, supra note 10, art. 11-51(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003).
80. Id. art. 111-8, O.J. C 169/1, at 29-30 (2003).
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in the provisions enabling the Council to take measures to com-
bat discrimination. These provisions and those of Article 11-21 of
the Draft Treaty have not been aligned.
Read jointly with the clauses of Articles 1-7(2) and 11-51(2)
of the Draft Treaty, the provisions of Article 111-8 of the Draft
Treaty suggest that the Union will not be more competent to
undertake positive actions than it is presently under Article 13 of
the EC Treaty, particularly in view of the emphasis they put on
the principle of conferral of powers."1 Indeed, even if the no-
tion of "membership of a national minority" were introduced in
the new Article 111-8 of the Draft Treaty by the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference in charge of adopting the Constitution, or more
generally, if the horizontal clauses of Articles 1-7(2) or 11-51 (2)
of the Draft Treaty were to be removed (which is highly un-
likely), a number of difficulties could still arise. In particular,
Article 111-8 of the Draft Treaty requires unanimity for the adop-
tion of measures to combat discrimination. Maintaining una-
nimity considerably undermines the likeliness of such measures
being adopted.8 2
Hence, the Draft Treaty does not seem to bring revolution-
ary changes regarding the Union's competence to adopt specific
measures against discrimination based on membership of a na-
tional minority. At best, the Union's institutions will have to take
the requirements of the Charter into account in defining and
implementing EU policies.8 " Otherwise, one could challenge
81. Id. art. 11-21, O.J. C 169/1 at 25 (2003). If the provisions of Article 11-21 of the
Draft Treaty are considered to establish a principle rather than rights as such (which is
unlikely considering the use of the expression, "shall be prohibited"), one would then
need to consider the provisions of Article 11-52(5) of the Draft Treaty:
The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented
by legislative and executive acts taken by Institutions and bodies of the Union,
and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the
exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in
the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.
Id. art. 11-52(5), O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003).
82. One could suggest the use of a flexibility clause on the basis of Article 1-17 of
the Draft Treaty to adopt the relevant measures; the procedure nevertheless requires
first a unanimous decision in the Council. Id. art. 1-17, O.J. C 169/1, at 11 (2003).
83. Although the horizontal clause on non-discrimination introduced by Article
111-3 of the Draft Treaty does not mention membership of national minorities either, it
provides that "[i]n defining and implementing the policies and activities referred to in
this Part, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation." Id. art. 111-3, O.J. C 169/
1, at 29 (2003). Considering that the Charter becomes binding and that the provisions
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any measure that would contradict them.
More generally, despite various changes which suggest that
the protection of minorities is expressly part of EU law, the fore-
going nevertheless shows that such protection is granted only a
modest role, at least much more modest than in the context of
accession conditionality, where it occupies a prominent place.
Perhaps the Convention's constitutional exercise should have
taken the minority issue more seriously in view of the persisting
problems that have been briefly recalled earlier, and as a matter
of consistency with the Union's actual policies, notably in the
context of the pre-accession strategy.
For instance, following Grdinne de Bfirca's and Jonathan
Zeitlin's suggestion to develop the use of the open method of
coordination ("OMC") mechanism 4 - now inserted in the
Draft Treaty85 - one could explore the expediency of this com-
parable arrangement to monitor the respect for and protection
of minorities in the Union. 6
of Article 14 ECHR belong to the general principles of Union Law, however, one could
argue that the Union should also, in defining and implementing the EU policies, aim to
combat discrimination based on membership of national minority.
84. The open method of coordination is explained in the Commission White Pa-
per on Governance along the following lines:
It is a way of encouraging co-operation, the exchange of best practice and
agreeing common targets and guidelines for Member States, sometimes
backed up by national action plans as in the case of employment and social
exclusion. It relies on regular monitoring of progress to meet those targets,
allowing Member States to compare their efforts and learn from the experi-
ence of others.
Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper,
COM (2001) 428 Final, at 21 (July 2001). See generally Griinne de Bfirca &Jonathan
Zeitlin, Constitutionalizing the Open Method of Coordination: What Should the Con-
vention Propose?, available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/
oth010203_en.pdf (Feb. 2003).
85. The term "OMC" does not appear explicitly in the Draft Constitution but the
mechanism can be found notably in the field of social policy. Draft Treaty, supra note
10, art. 111-107, OJ. C 169/1, at 49 (2003).
86. Combined with the other remedies explored in the paper, it would fill the gaps
of the system of reports set up in the context of the Council of Europe Framework
Convention on the Protection of Minorities. SeeJeremy McBride, Protecting Fundamental
Rights in Europe: A Legal Analysis, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 34, at 264. Another suggestion was made byJoszef Szjer, one of the
Hungarian members of the European Convention, who proposed that the EU have a
"minorities committee" that would oversee all issues affecting national or ethnic minori-
ties, e.g., educational issues, language preservation and cultural questions, but also
cross-border economic cooperation. It was suggested that the committee be established
within the European Parliament and be authorized to make any decisions. Jozsef
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CONCLUSION
While the requirement of respect for and protection of mi-
norities is prominent in the EU accession conditionality, the fact
that the Union is not well-equipped to monitor it internally leads
to a paradoxical situation. The pressure to respect and protect
minority rights will be less tangible for the new Member States
than it was when they were candidates.
A brief examination of the law under the TEU suggests that
remedies and guarantees exist to ensure that membership of a
national minority does not lead to discrimination. These reme-
dies and guarantees should be improved under the Constitution,
unless the Member States decide otherwise at the Intergovern-
mental Conference on the Future of the Union. However im-
proved, these guarantees nevertheless fall short of matching the
more active and persuasive approach that the EU adopted in the
pre-accession context to ensure both the respect for and the pro-
tection of minority rights. It has been suggested that the more
severe conditionality that characterizes this approach may cata-
lyze the need for the Union to become more involved in the
monitoring of the protection of minorities internally. The ratio-
nale of this additional involvement would be threefold. First, it
would provide the relevant tool to deal with the unfinished busi-
ness of accession preparation as regards minority protection.
Second, it would erase the perceived feeling of double standards
and make accession conditions and membership requirements
more consistent. Third, it would better ensure that the latter
requirements are more permanently observed by the Member
States, both old and new, and incidentally, it would improve the
legitimacy of the Union's conditionality.
Szajer, delegated by the Hungarian National Assembly, Unity in Diversity: Proposal for the
Representation of National and Ethnic Minorities in the Institutional System of the European
Union - Committee of National and Ethnic Minorities, CONV 580/03, CONTRIB 258 (Feb.
26, 2003), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cvOO/cvOO580en03.
pdf.
